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This article maps the trajectory of South Asian feminist struggles in Britain1 and analyses the 
key issues that have shaped them. We begin by setting the context for the emergence of a 
distinctive South Asian feminist voice out of existing forms of self-organisation and resistance 
within minority communities and its location at the intersection of gender, race and class. We 
then move on to outline the nature and effects of four decades of activism, policy interventions 
and practice by South Asian feminist groups in Britain. We locate this activism within the 
context of government policy and statutory practice that has shifted from multiculturalism to 
multifaithism and highlight the implications for women’s and girls’ rights and the costs to 
secular feminist provision, particularly in relation to combatting violence against women and 
girls. Lastly, we also analyse how recent neo-liberal policies of austerity and shrinking welfare 
provision pose key ideological challenges for South Asian feminist organising. 
 
Histories of migration and settlement in Britain: Early struggles on gender, race and class  
 
In the UK, ‘South Asian’ is the commonly utilised term for people who originate from India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. This is both on account of commonalities in socio-
cultural contexts and a shared colonial and anti-colonial past, as well as the complex histories 
of migration that shape these diasporic communities, some of which predate decolonisation. 
However, while this term emphasises commonality—in response to the common ‘othering’ of 
people of South Asian origin in dominant discourses on race through the racist and derogatory 
term ‘Paki’ as well as to more recent attempts by Hindus and Sikhs to distance themselves from 
Muslims in the UK and reproduce communal identities—it is also important to recognise the 
heterogeneous nature of the South Asian diaspora in Britain. Though the South Asian presence 
in the UK can be traced back to the beginning of the seventeenth century (Visram 2002), our 
focus is on the significant phase of South Asian migration that began in the 1950s. 
 
Jat Sikhs came to dominate the Indian migration stream to the UK in the 1950s (Tatla and 
Singh, 2006), though Punjabi migrants also included a sizeable minority of middle-and low-
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ranking castes. British passport-holders of Indian origin—a majority of whom can trace their 
origins to current-day Gujarat—settled in countries in East Africa (Twaddle 1990, 160) faced 
declining economic opportunities and insecurity upon the adoption of ‘Africanization’ policies 
by the newly independent countries in the 1960s. Many made the choice or were forced to 
migrate to the UK as entire family units. The primary phase of Pakistani migration to the UK 
was from the late 60s to early 70s, and was predominantly from Mirpur and Punjab while 
Bangladeshi migration began in the early 1970s from the Sylhet region of Bangladesh, as 
people fled from the civil unrest in their homeland. Civil unrest also created the context for 
Tamil Sri Lankan migration from the 1980s onwards. Similar to all migrants and irrespective 
of their caste and previous occupational status, South Asian migrants found work in the lowest 
rungs of the employment hierarchy in unskilled manual jobs. 
 
During the 1960s anti-immigration sentiments mobilised by racist groups and Conservative 
MPs such as Cyril Osborne and Enoch Powell informed successive legislation restricting the 
entry and settlement rights of Commonwealth citizens between 1962 and 1971 (Brah 1996, 
23). It is against this history of migration and settlement that South Asian feminisms asserted 
women’s rights to speak about domestic violence as part of a dialectical engagement with 
movements and groups focused on race and class and also a co-terminus exchange with the 
mainstream white British feminist movement. South Asian feminist activism built on and 
challenged two streams of South Asian political organising in Britain—struggles that forged 
class solidarities through a focus on discrimination and exploitation at work, led by the Indian 
Workers Association (IWA) and black sections within trade unions and the Labour Party; and 
a more vociferous, irreverent anti-racist politics led by the Asian Youth Movements (AYM) 
that organised against racist violence and police brutality. 
 
The IWA was originally founded as a welfare organisation for Indian migrants to England 
which provided support, guidance and advice on key areas such as housing, work and 
immigration rules and hosted a series of cultural events that acted as focal points for a South 
Asian sense of ‘community’. The IWA’s anti-colonial and secular framework that cut through 
religious and caste lines as well as a pan-South Asian sense of postcolonial solidarity (through 
links with the Pakistani Welfare Association) informed subsequent anti-racist and feminist 
groups. However, IWA was formed of two tendencies—one that supported the Indian 
government at all times and another left leaning, communist strand informed by the Ghadar 
Party and willing to critique the Indian state. When the former decided to host Indira Gandhi’s 
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visit to the UK inspite of the Emergency, the IWA split into IWA-Southall and IWA-GB. 
Nonetheless, they both mobilised against discriminatory employers and exclusionary trade 
unions (Kalra, 2017) and their community based self-organisation outside trade union 
structures was crucial in securing early victories for Indian workers as well as in the eventual 
recognition of issues of workplace racism and discrimination by British trade unions. Many 
branches of the IWA supported strikes led by Indian women against both white employers and 
Indian-owned textile factories that exploited women as cheap labour (Gill, 2013: 561), often in 
the absence of mainstream trade union support (Anitha and Pearson, 2018). However, the IWA 
membership and particularly the leadership predominantly comprised of Punjabi men and for 
a long time, they engaged with all issues involving South Asian women by reducing these to 
either class oppression or racism.  
 
South Asian feminisms in Britain also built upon the history of grassroots organising by groups 
such as AYM, who adopted a new militancy in a political stance that was informed by a critique 
of colonialism and identification with the revolutionary politics of the USA-based Black Power 
movement. Many South Asian feminists also started out (some continued) with the political 
identification of themselves as ‘black’ in order to emphasise the shared colonial pasts and 
ongoing racist exclusions of Africans and Asians living in the UK. AYMs engaged in direct 
action (with the slogans ‘Self Defence is No Offence’; ‘Here to Stay, Here to Fight’) to make 
demands of the British state as citizens, defend minority communities against Far Right 
mobilisations and daily racist violence as well as to highlight police harassment, immigration 
controls and other forms of institutional racism (Campaign Against Racism and 
Fascism/Southall Rights, 1981; Campaign Against Racism & Fascism and Newham 
Monitoring Project, 1991; Ramamurthy, 2006). Championing secular politics, they rejected 
caste-, religion- and nation-specific identities based on subcontinental politics and also 
mobilised against conservative elements within South Asian communities across the UK. 
Alongside the intellectual development of anti-racist academia (centred around the Institute of 
Race Relations and the Contemporary Centre for Cultural Studies), these groups were part of 
a rethink of the relationship between race and class as a move away from an economically 
deterministic Marxism. These debates and shifts also influenced prominent South Asian 
feminist activists and academics in the UK. However, apart from Manchester AYM, many of 
these groups were dominated by men and their organisational culture was distinctly patriarchal 
(Gupta, 2003; Ramamurthy, 2006: 51-52; Southall Black Sisters, 1990).  
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Issues of gender and race came together from the late 1970s in a series of the discriminatory 
immigration rules such as the ‘virginity tests’, primary purpose rule (PPR) and the one-year 
rule.  Immigration rules meant that a woman coming to Britain to marry a fiancé did not need 
a visa if her wedding was to be held within three months, though spouses required a visa. Based 
on gendered and racialized conceptions about South Asian women (Smith and Marmo, 2011), 
immigration officers at Heathrow airport would order a ‘virginity test’ to ascertain if a woman 
was already married, in measures which had a differential gendered impact (Wilson, 2006, pp. 
76-85). The different framings of this practice signalled the ideological differences at play: 
IWA projected this as an example of the racist assumptions that lie behind immigration controls 
and utilised the discourse of ‘honour’ to condemn this practice while South Asian feminist 
activists talked explicitly about sexual assault, violation of women’s bodily integrity, and 
highlighted the gendered impact of these racist immigration controls. These measures were 
subsequently abandoned in the face of widespread protests. 
 
The primary purpose rule (PPR) and the one-year rule introduced a probationary period 
following migration during which a person had no recourse to public funds (NRPF), in a series 
of policies that were aimed at closing immigration routes into the UK through marriage 
migration (Sachdeva, 1993). The PPR required applicants to prove that the main purpose of 
their marriage was not settlement in the UK. This requirement constructed genuine marriages 
in South Asian communities—which were often arranged marriages where the couple may not 
be able to demonstrate a prior relationship and knowledge of each other—as marriages of 
convenience, alleging that the primary purpose of such marriages was to facilitate entry to 
Britain for the foreign spouse (Menski, 1999). Such restrictive immigration policies and 
practices became the target of extensive campaigns across the UK, such as the campaign for 
Anwar Ditta. Ditta was born in Birmingham but was sent to live with her father’s family in 
Pakistan when her parents separated and eventually married and had three children there. She 
and her husband decided to return to England, and left their children in Pakistan while they 
found a house and work, intending to send for the children as soon as they were settled. On 
returning to Britain, Ditta and her husband remarried believing that their Islamic marriage 
would not be recognised under English law. In 1979, when they applied to bring their children 
to the UK, their application was denied despite evidence including birth certificates for the 
children. Her cause was successfully taken up by anti-racist groups including the AYM, 
particularly its Manchester women’s wing which took part in a range of anti-deportation and 
divided-family campaigns effecting women (Ramamurthy, 2006). 
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Feminist organising on violence against women and girls  
 
South Asian women’s autonomous political organising emerged as part of Black feminist 
critique of white feminism, as well as in response to the neglect of gender within male 
dominated anti-racist and class-based politics. Anti-racist and class-based organisations such 
as the IWA and some branches of the AYM were notably silent, if not hostile, to conversations 
about violence against women. They considered any focus on domestic violence or on the 
regressive implications of the rise of religious fundamentalism on women’s rights within South 
Asian communities as fuelling the flames of racism and a matter that pertained to the private 
sphere, to be resolved within the family and community (see below for a discussion of how this 
was also a position supported by the British state). South Asian feminist responses were not 
homogeneous as is evident from the pieces within the iconic CCCS collection of essays—see 
Carby (1981) and Parmar (1981) who reflect on the problem with raising concerns about 
domestic violence in a context where the state and media outlets are pathologizing black 
families. 
 
Nonetheless, South Asian feminist organising in Britain grew out of recognition of the 
intersecting inequalities faced by South Asian women whose experiences of disadvantage and 
discrimination in the public sphere intersected with their experiences of violence and 
subordination within the home. During 1975 and 1976, a group of women activists, social 
workers and anti-racist campaigners in London began meeting to share their concerns about 
South Asian women who wanted to escape domestic violence but felt that they had nowhere to 
go. Mirroring debates unfolding among black feminists in the US, they highlighted how 
survivors of domestic violence faced both exclusion and multiple barriers to mainstream 
services such as racism and lack of understanding of their specific needs related to particular 
forms of domestic violence (Larasi, 2013) as well as patriarchal silencing from South Asian 
community and religious organisations (Gupta, 2003; Southall Black Sisters, 1990). They 
argued that access to black and minority ethnic (BME) women-only spaces were invaluable to 
women who may be simultaneously victimised by various forms of violence within and outside 
their homes, and that the option to escape domestic violence for a space where they may be 
subject to racism by service providers or other survivors was unacceptable. These struggles 
pitted South Asian feminists against the British state, against dominant voices and 
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organisations within their own community, as well as against white feminists who were 
reluctant to recognise difference and the impact of racism. 
 
Southall Black Sisters (SBS) was founded in 1979 by African Caribbean and Asian women 
already engaged with the revolutionary politics of an emergent anti-racist movement and a 
thriving white feminist movement. They pushed for the right to women’s autonomous 
organisation as an empowering way for minority women to do politics and to speak out on the 
violence within their homes. They challenged the sexism of the male-dominated spaces around 
them (for which they were derided) and, influenced by the history of feminist campaigns in the 
Indian sub-continent, they organised public demonstrations for justice for South Asian women 
killed by families and husbands within their local area. Importantly, these public 
demonstrations were led by South Asian women but welcomed majority ethnicities and men 
as part of a politics of solidarity rather than separatism (Gupta, 2003).  
 
The first specialist refuges for South Asian women in the UK, Asha Projects in South London 
and Saheli in Manchester, welcomed women and children in 1979 and 1980 and remain open 
today. Over the 1980s, there grew a network of specialist services for South Asian women in 
England, Wales and Scotland that primarily addressed issues of domestic violence. In keeping 
with feminist principles, organisations such as SBS and Asha Projects were initially organised 
as collectives but state funding requirements impelled them to adopt more hierarchical 
management structures. The 1980s was also a period when South Asian feminists made 
alliances with other black feminist organisations in the UK such as Birmingham Black Sisters, 
OWAAD (Organisation of Women of African and Asian descent), Brixton Black women’s 
group and Women Against Fundamentalism. 
 
South Asian feminist activism also had a significant impact on broader feminist issues, as with 
the campaign for Kiranjit Ahluwalia. After suffering abuse and brutality for 10 years, she set 
fire to her husband Deepak in May 1989. Rejecting her plea of manslaughter, the jury found 
her guilty of murder, with the judge declaring that the violence she had suffered was “not 
serious”. Kiranjit's plea failed because of the gendered construction of the defence of 
provocation: it tended to benefit male defendants who are physically capable of reacting 
instantaneously when provoked, whereas women facing male violence may be constrained by 
men's greater physical strength and size. Due to the time that had elapsed between Deepak's 
last attack and her retaliation, Kiranjit’s actions were construed as pre-meditated. SBS secured 
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leave to appeal and the Court of Appeal accepted that the requirement and interpretation of a 
‘sudden and temporary loss of self-control’ excluded the experiences of battered women. It 
recognised the notion of cumulative provocation and accepted that the time lapse between 
provocation and the fatal act could be seen as a ‘boiling over’ period rather than as a ‘cooling-
off’ period. At the retrial in 1992 Kiranjit was found guilty of manslaughter due to diminished 
responsibility and sentenced to three years and four months (the time she had already served) 
and was released immediately. 
 
By highlighting how the gendered framing of the legal subject disadvantaged women, this 
campaign led by SBS and supported by Justice for Women who advocated for a number of 
cases of ‘battered women who kill’ eventually led to a reform of the law of murder in England 
and Wales in 2010, when the requirement of ‘suddeness’ was removed. Unfortunately, the way 
that the distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ victims is institutionalised, 
gendered and raced within the practice of the British criminal justice system meant that other 
cases of women who killed their abusive partners (such as Zoora Shah) did not gain as much 
empathy despite campaigning efforts of South Asian feminist organisations (Patel, 2003).  
 
Violence against women and girls in minoritised communities: From invisibility to 
hypervisibility 
 
South Asian feminist activism in Britain has challenged both dominant gendered norms within 
South Asian diasporas which scaffold violence against women and girls (VAWG) and 
challenged the British state to respond to this violence through protective and preventative 
mechanisms. Early feminist activism challenged the construction of domestic violence as 
intimate partner violence, which elided particular forms of VAWG such as forced marriage, 
and family violence by in-laws from the frame of reference. For example, practitioners 
considered girls fleeing forced marriage as runaway children and routinely sent them back 
home to face further violence (Patel, 1991; Siddiqui, 2003). Domestic violence service 
providers failed to recognise that in some South Asian families, in-laws may be the joint or 
sole perpetrators of abuse. Violence by in-laws still remains somewhat neglected as the broader 
assumption of male-on-female interpersonal violence informs much of the theorising and 
practice on domestic violence, particularly in the West.  
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Over the last three decades, feminist campaigns to raise awareness of these specific forms of 
VAWG have led to measures such as guidelines for statutory services on forced marriage, 
improved support for victims and survivors, and in 2004, the adoption of a cross-government 
definition of domestic violence that included forced marriage, honour-based violence and 
violence from family members and not just intimate partner violence. 
 
However, in recent years—particularly since 9/11 and the mobilisation of a discourse of ‘clash 
of civilisations’ in Bush/Blair’s so-called ‘war on terror’—there has been a shift from 
invisibility to hypervisibility of VAWG in minority ethnic communities. The disabling 
paradigms which construct South Asian women as confined to the ‘problematic private sphere’ 
and the overwhelming emphasis on religion and culture as the basis of violence against 
minority ethnic women have been critiqued by post-colonial feminists (Narayan, 1997). Within 
post-feminist discourses which posit that the battle for gender equality has been won in the 
West, any misogyny or VAWG is constructed as a remnant of the past or the pathological 
behaviour of some individuals that is unconnected to broader socio-cultural norms in the West. 
At the same time, VAWG within BME communities in the West and in other parts of the world 
is constructed as rooted in culture and as the real problem facing societies. It is within such 
discourses that conservative groups have articulated their opposition to teaching sex and 
relationships education (SRE/PSHE) in schools for all children as a means to combatting 
VAWG whilst they lend support to targeted violence-prevention education for BME 
communities within which VAWG is presumed to be the norm (Anitha and Gill, 2015). 
 
These intersecting issues posed by gender and race have, to some extent, created fissures 
among avowedly feminist groupings acting on behalf of South Asian women in Britain. Some 
feminist organisations such as SBS, Asian Women Unite/Freedom Without Fear Platform and 
Imkaan have been critical of this lens of essentialism whilst continuing to challenge VAWG, 
while others have embraced dominant essentialist constructions of this violence as a route to 
state action and resources. Government consultations on the criminalisation of forced marriage, 
which eventually came into force in 2014 in England and Wales, laid bare this divide. Groups 
like Karma Nirvana welcomed criminalisation, while groups including SBS and Imkaan argued 
for a robust response to forced marriage through strengthening and implementing the existing 
package of protective responses to VAWG and for forced marriage to be considered a particular 
form of domestic violence rather than singled out. 
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VAWG related to structural inequalities: State welfare and immigration policy 
 
Compared to forms of VAWG that can be attributable to culture and are perceived as signifiers 
of difference, the British state has been far more reluctant to address manifestations of violence 
which are exacerbated and sustained by the intersection of gender with race, class and state 
policies. 
 
One of the long-standing campaigns by South Asian feminists from mid 1990s was to highlight 
the impact of state immigration and welfare policies that effectively prevented migrant women 
from leaving abusive relationships (Joshi, 2003). Marriage migrants were granted dependent 
visas which tied their residence and entitlement to welfare benefits with their marital status, 
thereby placing women in a position where being divorced or disowned by their husbands could 
mean deportation and separation from their children. This is one of the many ways in which 
the citizenship and residency regimes play a role in creating an imbalance between men and 
women who migrate, particularly as a family. Before 2002, marriage migrants to the UK who 
left their abusive husbands before they secured their independent immigration status were 
routinely deported to their country of origin, often to face further abuse from their families for 
not ‘making the marriage work’. In 2002, in response to campaigns from South Asian feminist 
organisations, the Labour government passed the Domestic Violence Rule. These changes 
made it possible for a woman to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) in the UK if she 
could prove that her marriage had broken down because of domestic violence. However, 
women with insecure immigration status had no recourse to public funds (NRPF), which meant 
that they could not be accommodated in women’s refuges. This rule left women destitute while 
they were expected to apply for ILR (Anitha, 2011). Led by SBS, South Asian feminist groups 
such as Saheli, Imkaan and allied organisations including Amnesty International campaigned 
to change this, resulting in the Destitute Domestic Violence (DDV) Concession of 2010, which 
gives women limited access to benefits while they apply for expedited ILR. Many women, 
however, remain excluded as the DDV Concession only applies to those who entered the UK 
on a spousal visa. 
 
Related to the issue of NRPF, the abandonment of wives in their home countries by their 
husbands who are UK residents has become a growing phenomenon whereby a marriage 
migrant within the probationary period of dependent visa is taken back deceptively to her 
country of origin and abandoned there with or without her children, while her husband returns 
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to the UK and revokes her visa. Such abandonment commonly takes place within a context of 
other forms of violence, abuse and exploitation. Following abandonment, ex-parte divorce 
proceedings are often initiated by the husband, in a context where women are ignorant of the 
proceedings or cannot represent themselves in legal proceedings due to factors including 
financial constraints and denial of the requisite visa by the UK immigration service. This 
problem has been reported in the context of Indian-, Pakistani-, and Bangladeshi-origin men in 
the UK as well as other countries with histories of migration and of transnational marriages. 
Research on transnationally abandoned wives in India indicates that few abandoned women in 
India receive financial settlement, maintenance or return of their dowry (Anitha et al, 2018). 
The consequences of abandonment include severe social stigma, poverty and destitution. 
 
Beyond the socio-cultural contexts which shape all forms of VAWG, it is the inadequacy of 
national and transnational legal mechanisms that make transnational brides a particularly 
vulnerable category of women who can be treated as disposable women, whose abuse is of no 
concern to the British state. Abusive men have been able to weaponise the UK government’s 
determination to create a ‘hostile environment’ for immigrants in order to deny women their 
rights and to exacerbate their control over their wives (McVeigh, 2018). South Asian feminist 
groups have recently begun campaigning on this issue and have gained some concessions 
within the family justice system, whereby transnational abandonment is now recognised as a 
form of domestic abuse. This will enable abandoned women who manage to return to the UK 
to access legal aid to fight for financial settlement upon divorce and reunion with their children.  
 
These recent campaigns are part of a long history of mobilisation by South Asian feminist 
groups that have highlighted and challenged the differential gendered implications of what are 
often constructed as gender-neutral immigration controls. Despite gains made over the last two 
decades, there remains a long way to go to ensure that immigration control does not serve to 
deny women their human rights. 
 
From multiculturalism to multifaithism: Resisting state policies and fundamentalist 
mobilisations from below 
 
Culture and religion have become an inextricable part of conversations about South Asians in 
Britain including in relation to VAWG. This section will focus on how South Asian feminists 
developed criticisms of multiculturalism as state policy in the UK and, more recently, the 
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transition from multiculturalism to multifaithism in the context of a neo-liberal retraction of 
the welfare state.  
 
Multiculturalism refers to a postwar settlement between the state and Britain’s ethnic 
minorities, established in 1966 by the then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins as a way to encourage 
cultural tolerance, to validate diversity in the context of prejudice, racist violence and the 
assimilationist idea that minorities have separate and distinct cultures and traditions that should 
be left at the border to integrate into the ‘host’ community. On the face of it, multiculturalism 
is an important state position and multicultural conviviality has been an important lived reality 
for minorities in the UK. However, multicultural governance became a means for the state to 
sidestep more difficult questions about direct racism, power relations, structural racism and 
socio-economic inequality in favour of exoticised displays of diversity (samosas, saris and steel 
bands) and shallow ‘cultural awareness training’ (Hall, 2000) . South Asian feminists argued 
that multiculturalism in practice is an undemocratic process that manages ethnic minority 
communities through a layer of ‘community leaders’, who are almost always male and 
conservative, and projects minority communities as homogeneous, ignoring power relations 
within minority communities along the lines of gender, class, religion and caste. Moreover, 
multiculturalist practice by state agencies means minority women and girls receive a different 
response to VAWG either because practitioners misrecognise violence and abuse by assuming 
it is a cultural or religious tradition or because they assume that these issues need to be tackled 
by minority communities themselves and so refer women/girls back to families and community 
leaderships, who might have been involved in perpetrating abuse or entrapping women in 
abusive relationships. In effect, multiculturalism was experienced as another form of racism as 
minority women and girls were not given access to the same services or national principles that 
had been widely accepted for majority women fleeing violence and abuse. The most 
conservative sections of minority communities worked through multiculturalist practice to hold 
on to power over their communities by re-affirming culturalist and ethnicist arguments and 
promoting the same ‘hands off’ practice as professionals within statutory agencies. 
 
As the Thatcher years waned and New Labour came to power in 1997, many South Asian 
feminists were hopeful of a new relationship with the British state as New Labour quickly 
embarked on inquiries into forms of VAWG within minority communities (e.g. forced marriage 
and female genital mutilation) and detrimental state policies (e.g. NRPF discussed above). 
Mike O Brien, a senior New Labour politician central to taking these issues forward, seemed 
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to bolster the feminist critique of multiculturalism by calling for a ‘mature multiculturalism’ 
that did not give way to ‘moral blindness’ by viewing culture and religion as justifications for 
violence and abuse within minority communities (Siddiqui, 2003). Moreover, forced marriage 
and honour-based violence were flagged as human rights abuses as a consequence of the South 
Asian feminist lobby, within a context where the Human Rights Act 1998 provided renewed 
currency for international human rights conventions that also recognised the role of the state in 
protecting women against violence by non-state actors and in the private sphere.  
 
However, these advancements belied another important facet of the New Labour machinery 
that put in motion a slide from multiculturalism to multifaithism. Religious identities, religious 
groups and male religious leaders have always been central to the British state’s relationship 
with ethnic minorities, a remnant of colonial systems of power. However, New Labour ushered 
in a new settlement that extended central state funding to religious organisations (including by 
exponentially increasing the number of state funded faith-based schools), created a new Faiths 
Sector, and included them in negotiations about all forms of social policy even in those areas, 
such as violence against women, where they had no previous experience. For example, New 
Labour constituted a ‘Working Group on Forced Marriage’ which gave considerable weight to 
the voices of community and religious ‘leaders’ and its recommendations ultimately comprised 
the national standards set for tackling other forms of VAWG (Siddiqui, 2003). This new 
settlement was the result of a dialectical interaction between state policy and the ardent and 
sophisticated activities of conservative religious groupings and fundamentalist mobilisations 
from below. Transnational Hindu, Muslim and Sikh fundamentalist mobilisations had 
comfortably settled within local areas in the UK and, through multicultural governance, they 
had acquired legitimacy as part of a system of state patronage. However, this new settlement 
was not limited to minority religions, it also amplified the voice of mainstream and minority 
Christian formations and religious organisations of all hues. Multifaithism has also been linked 
to the value of communitarianism for neo-liberal conceptions of the welfare state where 
individuals are governed through and provided for by ‘communities of allegiance’ to enable a 
roll back of state provision. The way in which communitarianism has been reinvented to service 
the neo-liberal state bears a marked continuity between New Labour and subsequent 
Conservative governments as do the deals struck with religious organisations to ensure and 
support the state’s monopoly on violence.  
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Religion has become a structuring principle for all manner of social policies including post 
9/11 responses to fundamentalism (the Prevent programme2) and a wide range of social 
problems that were reconstructed as an issue of ethnic minority integration/segregation 
(Community Cohesion and later Integration policies). It has been argued that New Labour’s 
response at the turn of the century marked a return to assimilationism (Back et al, 2002), but in 
actual fact multifaithism elevated religion as the main signifier of difference and amplified 
religious voice and sensitivities in policy consultations and allocation of state resources. In 
practice, wherever the state has pulled back, religious organisations have utilised their social 
capital and social networks to step in. We highlight three specific examples that demonstrate 
the implications of multifaithist practice on South Asian women and girls and the challenges 
to these developments posed by South Asian feminisms. 
 
One of the earliest examples of the way in which multifaithist practice impacted secular 
feminist provision is from 2005 when the Mayor of London’s Policy Advisor on Women’s 
Issues invited religious leaders to a roundtable discussion on domestic violence. Long standing 
secular feminist organisations that had developed expertise in this area were not invited to the 
meeting. The event led to the publication of a report entitled Praying for Peace (GLA, 2006) 
which encouraged partnerships between religious leaders and (feminist) domestic violence 
agencies (but without any space for a right of reply from those agencies) and, moreover, pushed 
the issue of violence against women into a framework of religious literacy, ‘utilising religious 
notions of karma and sin’ in place of ‘feminist notions of human rights, choice and autonomy’ 
(Dhaliwal and Patel, 2012: 189).   
 
The second example relates to South Asian feminist mobilisations against gender 
discrimination in faith schools. Two South Asian feminist organisations—Inspire and SBS— 
submitted evidence in a case against a school that that practiced gender segregation of its pupils. 
They argued that such segregation is the consequence of a fundamentalist lobby that seeks to 
reproduce views of women and girls as inferior, control female sexuality and sexual 
interactions, and seeks to limits girls’ choices and confine them to the private sphere. In 
October 2017, the Court of Appeal ruled that a co-educational Muslim school had acted 
unlawfully by segregating boys and girls on the basis that the lack of interaction between the 
two limits the social development of both. This finding followed on from campaigns against 
Universities UK’s support for gender segregation at University events and the Law Society’s 
defence of ‘shariah compliant’ legal guidance on inheritance (Patel and Sahgal, 2016).  
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These campaigns have demonstrated not only that the British state encapsulates contradictory 
tendencies but also that fundamentalist organisations remain important partners of the State 
and that fundamentalist discourse has gained legitimacy in a wide range of spaces, carried by 
multiculturalist tendencies that have institutionalised inequality and discrimination on the 
grounds of cultural and religious relativism. Moreover, recent UK governments have been keen 
to challenge Muslim fundamentalist formations while simultaneously influenced by Christian 
Right activists (see Dhaliwal, 2017) and willing to turn a blind eye to the proliferation of 
religious fundamentalism among communities which are assumed to have ‘integrated’ 
economically—for example, Christian, Jewish, Hindu and Sikh school practices are subject to 
far less scrutiny than Muslim ones.  
 
The third example relates to recent parliamentary debates on sex selective abortion (SSA). In 
the context of media reports which claimed that SSA was ‘commonplace’ among South Asian 
diasporas in the UK, anti-abortionist Conservative MP Fiona Bruce introduced a Private 
Members’ Bill, Abortion (Sex-Selection) Bill 2014-15, which aimed to ‘clarify the law’ 
relating to abortion on the basis of sex-selection (Anitha and Gill, 2018). Bruce and her 
supporters problematised SSA as one particular manifestation of a broader problem of VAWG 
in minority communities whereby, in a context of son-preference, South Asian women are 
coerced to terminate female foetuses. The Parliament was presented with the prospect of 
protecting minority women’s rights by supporting measures that would have resulted in greater 
scrutiny by doctors of minority women’s abortion decisions. This campaign against what was 
termed as ‘gendercide’ was led by right wing Christian organisations who garnered political 
space and legitimacy within the context of a national turn to communitarianism and a discourse 
about British values and cohesion which is underpinned by notions of Christian supremacy and 
anti-Muslim sentiment (Dhaliwal, 2017). Their fundamentalist instrumentalisation of women’s 
rights in their war on abortion received support from some self-proclaimed pro-choice and 
feminist South Asian women’s groups such as Karma Nirvana and Jeena International.  
 
There was only one dissenting vote against Bruce’s bill. The unexpected appeal of this 
argument for the parliamentarians can be explained through what feminist postcolonial 
critiques (Mohanty, 1991; Narayan, 1997) describe as an impulse to ‘save brown women from 
brown men’ in a re-run of the paternalistic feminism that informed the British colonial ban on 
sati in India (Mani, 1999). It was also a consequence of a heightened Christian Right influence 
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on Conservative Party politics and their growing sophistication and multi-layered approach to 
identifying opportunities that can curtail reproductive rights (Dhaliwal, 2017).  Bruce’s Bill 
framed a particular set of socio-economic and cultural contexts within minority communities 
as coercive, eliding a variety of other socio-economic, political and cultural constraints in both 
minority and majority communities within which all women make decisions to continue with 
or terminate pregnancies. This rhetoric of choice frames white women as free agents when 
making reproductive decisions and so differentiates them from their particularly constrained 
British Asian counterparts. The arguments presented in support of the Bill help explain the 
cross-party support for it in a context where parliamentary debates on abortion had hitherto 
been sharply polarised in Britain (Anitha and Gill, 2018). 
 
Bruce subsequently proposed an amendment to Section 65, Part 5 of the Serious Crime Bill 
2014, arguing that the ‘New Clause 1’ should state that ‘Nothing in section 1 of the Abortion 
Act 1967 is to be interpreted as allowing a pregnancy to be terminated on the grounds of the 
sex of the unborn child’. A range of feminist, pro-choice and medical practitioners’ associations 
mobilised to challenge this proposed amendment. Whilst recognising SSA as a form of VAWG, 
SBS argued that rather than focusing on services that might support women in leaving violent 
relationships or empower them in exercising meaningful choices in their lives, Bruce’s 
amendment represented yet another instance of the government’s ‘resource neutral’ solutions 
aimed at (ostensibly) protecting black and minority women (Dhaliwal, 2017; SBS, 2015). 
These critics argued that the criminalisation of SSA was not likely to make women safer in a 
context of shrinking service provision and could be detrimental to the very women it sought to 
help. These contributions were crucial in shaping the course of the debates on the proposed 
amendment, which was defeated.  
 
South Asian feminists have been at the forefront of struggles against fundamentalism in the 
UK and have mobilised against the rise of religious fundamentalism in South Asia, including 
the rise of state-sponsored Hindutva politics in India. However, these cases discussed above 
have also highlighted the absence of uniform understandings of and commitment to challenging 
fundamentalism and the increasing detachment of feminist critique from secularism (Bracke, 
2008). This is reflected among some South Asian feminist groups in Britain who have adopted 
an anti-racist defence of all Muslim identities in the wake of the War on Terror, irrespective of 
whether these are expressions of a left leaning, egalitarian politics or markers of the successful 
influence of right wing fundamentalist projects. On the other hand, some South Asian women’s 
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groups have also come to find themselves in close alliances with Christian, Hindu and Sikh 
fundamentalist formations without a critical eye on their motivations and objectives. 
 
South Asian feminisms in the era of neo-liberalism and austerity 
 
In contrast to the willingness of the British state to address particular forms of VAWG through 
essentialist discourses and resource-neutral solutions as discussed above, since the election of 
the Conservative (led) government of 2010, their ideological cuts to public services have led 
to the rapid erosion of specialist domestic violence services (Imkaan, 2016). Research 
documents that women report feeling safer to speak about their experiences of violence in an 
environment where staff have the knowledge and expertise in providing specialist support to 
women, and that BME specialist services are often a woman’s first point of contact and often 
a conduit to statutory services (Larasi, 2013). This erosion of BME specialist service provision 
has not gone unchallenged. 
 
In 2008, SBS mounted a legal challenge against their local authority which had changed the 
terms of its funding on the grounds that specialist services for ethnic minority women worked 
against their commitments to community cohesion. The local authority decided to commission 
a generic domestic violence service instead. SBS was concerned that, if left unchallenged, 
Ealing Council’s approach would have allowed public bodies to redefine the notion of equality, 
which in this context had become ‘the need to provide the same services for everyone’ (Patel 
and Sen, 2011) —a radical departure from the recognition of intersectionality that had led to 
the creation of specialist services in the first place. Meanwhile, SBS discovered that the same 
local authority was using their Prevent and Cohesion funds to create and consolidate religion-
specific groups, including Muslim women’s groups (ibid). This replicated developments in 
other parts of the country, where BME community and women’s groups were forced to 
transform the nature of their organisations either by becoming generic services for all women 
fleeing violence to abide by the terms of new commissioning regimes (that also require 
organisations to do more for less money) or by establishing Muslim specific programmes in 
order to attract Prevent or Cohesion funding (Kundnani, 2009). SBS won that legal challenge3 
based on their argument that BME specific services continue to be vital spaces within which 
minority women become empowered and more able to participate in the wider public sphere. 
Moreover, they underlined the importance of secular spaces both for challenging 
fundamentalism and for enabling cohesion.  
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Sadly, not all South Asian women’s organisations have been able to muster the resources or 
the capacity to initiate and sustain a campaign or a judicial challenge to this retrenchment of 
specialism. This is also a consequence of the gradual erosion of their campaigning or political 
work in response to constraints imposed by state funding and registered charitable status, which 
proscribes political work or campaigning. This has led to the professionalization of domestic 
violence services, which has now left some organisations unable to resist what is an 
ideologically driven challenge to their very existence. Where such a reduction of specialism 
has taken place, these services have lost their autonomy, become part of a suite of services 
offered by a large, single provider and become delinked from the specialist BME women’s 
sector (and movement). Imkaan (2016) argues that this delinking is particularly problematic, 
in that the development of autonomous BME spaces has been an essential element of BME 
women’s strategies not only of surviving violence, but of organising to prevent and resist 
violence—“As such we are not just losing services, we are losing expertise, specialism and 
‘voice’” (Imkaan 2016: 15).  
 
The multiple and intersecting needs that BME women experiencing domestic violence face on 
account of the disadvantages created by gender, race, class and religion have not dissipated. In 
this context, the undermining of funding for specialist services threatens to once again create a 
landscape where some women find themselves unable to leave an abusive relationship to safe 
and supportive spaces. The refuge movement grew out of women’s activism in response to 
unmet needs. In a context of austerity and ideological resistance to specialism, the space to 
meet those needs seems to be shrinking once again. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have explored the nature and trajectory of the ideological drivers and challenges for South 
Asian feminist organising in Britain which come from a confluence of interconnected factors:  
the persistence of violence against women and girls; the neo-liberal retrenchment of the state; 
the increasing turn to religion by the state; the rise of fundamentalism in civil society; as well 
as by ongoing issues posed by racism and essentialist ‘othering’ discourses reproduced by the 
British state, within the civil society and some strands of white feminism. This analysis charts 
the history and the politics of South Asian feminisms in Britain more broadly but particularly 
in England, which mirror feminist engagements in other diasporic contexts where issues posed 
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by gender inequalities intersect with race, class and religion. These struggles also arguably 
resonate with feminist mobilisations in India and in South Asia.  
 
Endnotes 
1. Our focus is primarily on South Asian feminist activism in England; however many of the historical 
issues that have shaped this activism relate to Britain more broadly, particularly prior to the creation of 
devolved governments in Scotland and Wales in 1999. In part, our focus on England is related to the 
most ‘visible’ manifestations of South Asian feminist activism which has often centred around a few 
key organisations/movements. We are aware that we have not paid attention to the specific histories 
and issues that have shaped diaspora communities and South Asian women’s organising that has been 
specific to Scotland and Wales. 
2. The Prevent programme was set up by the Labour government in 2003 and extended by the 
Conservative-Lib-dem Coalition government in 2011 as part of its counter-terrorism strategy with the 
aim of stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It has been criticised for its 
disproportionate focus on Muslim communities in comparison to far-right groups. 
3. See R (Kaur & Shah) v Ealing London Borough Council & EHRC [2008] EWHC 2062 (Admin) 
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